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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Supreme Court 
The State, Respondent, 
v. 
Shane Adam Burdette, Petitioner. 
Appellate Case No. 2017-001990 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from Oconee County 
J. Cordell Maddox Jr., Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 27910 
Heard February 21, 2019 – Filed July 31, 2019 
REVERSED AND REMANDED 
Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, 
for Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney 
General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy 
Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General William M. Blitch Jr., and Assistant 
Attorney General Susannah Rawl Cole, all of Columbia; 
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and Solicitor David Rhys Wagner Jr., of Anderson, all for 
Respondent. 
JUSTICE JAMES: Shane Adam Burdette was indicted and tried for murder and 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Over Burdette's 
objection, the trial court charged the jury that it could infer the element of malice 
from the use of a deadly weapon. The jury convicted Burdette of the lesser-included 
offense of voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the 
commission of a violent crime. The court of appeals affirmed Burdette's conviction, 
holding that although the trial court erred in giving the inferred malice jury 
instruction, Burdette suffered no prejudice. State v. Burdette, Op. No. 2017-UP-237 
(S.C. Ct. App. filed June 7, 2017). We granted Burdette's petition for a writ of 
certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. We hold the trial court's erroneous 
jury instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  We therefore reverse 
and remand for a new trial on the offenses of voluntary manslaughter and possession 
of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  We also hold, regardless of 
the evidence presented at trial, a trial court shall no longer instruct a jury that malice 
may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon.   
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Burdette shot and killed Evan Tyner (Victim). Victim died from a single 
shotgun pellet wound to the back of his neck. After the shooting, Burdette gave 
several inconsistent statements to law enforcement. The State's theory of the case 
and Burdette's theory of the case were substantially different.  The State claimed  
murder; Burdette claimed accident.  Burdette was indicted for murder and possession 
of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.   
At trial, evidence was presented in support of both the State's and Burdette's 
theories of the case. Following the close of the presentation of evidence, the trial 
court informed the parties it intended to charge the jury on the law of murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and accident.  The trial court  
gave the parties a copy of its proposed jury charge for review. Burdette objected to 
the trial court's proposed instruction that inferred malice could arise when a deadly 
weapon is used. Citing State v. Belcher,1 Burdette argued the instruction was 
1 385 S.C. 597, 612, 685 S.E.2d 802, 810 (2009).  
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inappropriate because there was evidence presented that could reduce, excuse, 
justify, or mitigate the homicide. The trial court gave the charge over Burdette's 
objection. 
The trial court charged the law of murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
involuntary manslaughter, and accident. When charging the law of murder, the trial 
court defined murder as a killing with malice aforethought and stated to the jury, 
"Inferred malice may also arise when the deed is done with a deadly weapon." When 
charging the law of voluntary manslaughter, the trial court did not specifically  
inform the jury that malice is not an element of that offense. However, when 
charging the law of involuntary manslaughter, the trial court specifically informed 
the jury that malice is not an element of that offense. Of course, malice is not an 
element of either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. 
After deliberating for about one hour, the jury requested additional instruction 
from the trial court on the law of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary 
manslaughter to provide the jury with "a better understanding" of the different 
charges. The trial court essentially repeated its previous instruction and again 
included in the murder instruction that the jury could infer the element of malice 
from the use of a deadly weapon. The trial court again did not inform the jury that 
malice is not an element of voluntary manslaughter but did inform the jury that 
malice is not an element of involuntary manslaughter. 
The jury found Burdette not guilty of murder but guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  
The trial court sentenced Burdette to twenty-five years in prison, suspended upon 
the service of fifteen years and five years' probation for voluntary manslaughter. The 
trial court also sentenced Burdette to a consecutive prison term of five years for the 
weapon possession charge. 
Burdette appealed, arguing the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that 
malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon because evidence was 
presented tending to reduce, mitigate, excuse, or justify the homicide. The court of 
appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. State v. Burdette, Op. No. 2017-UP-
237 (S.C. Ct. App. filed June 7, 2017). Although the court of appeals agreed the 
inferred malice jury instruction was erroneous, it held Burdette "suffered no 
prejudice" from the erroneous instruction. Id. The court of appeals reasoned 
Burdette was convicted of voluntary manslaughter—not murder—and because 
malice is not an element of voluntary manslaughter, the inferred malice instruction 
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could not have contributed to the verdict. Id. This Court granted certiorari to review 
the court of appeals' decision. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in giving the inferred malice instruction? 
2. If error, was the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? 
3. Does the inferred malice instruction continue to have validity?   
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Inferred Malice Jury Instruction 
1. Was the Jury Instruction Erroneous? 
There was evidence presented at trial that tended to reduce, mitigate, excuse, 
or justify Burdette's killing of Victim—making the trial court's inferred malice 
instruction inappropriate. See State v. Stanko, 402 S.C. 252, 260, 741 S.E.2d 708, 
712 (2013) ("A jury charge instructing that malice may be inferred from the use of 
a deadly weapon is no longer good law in South Carolina where evidence is 
presented that would reduce, mitigate, excuse, or justify the homicide." (citing State 
v. Belcher, 385 S.C. 597, 600, 685 S.E.2d 802, 803-04 (2009))). The State rightly 
concedes this point. The court of appeals therefore correctly held the giving of the 
instruction in this case was error. 
2. Was the Trial Court's Error Harmless? 
An erroneous instruction alone is insufficient to warrant this Court's reversal.  
"Errors, including erroneous jury instructions, are subject to harmless error 
analysis." Belcher, 385 S.C. at 611, 685 S.E.2d at 809. "When considering whether 
an error with respect to a jury instruction was harmless, we must 'determine beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.'"  
State v. Middleton, 407 S.C. 312, 317, 755 S.E.2d 432, 435 (2014) (quoting State v. 
Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 144-45, 498 S.E.2d 212, 218 (Ct. App. 1998)). "In making a 
harmless error analysis, our inquiry is not what the verdict would have been had the 
jury been given the correct charge, but whether the erroneous charge contributed to 
the verdict rendered." Id. (quoting Kerr, 330 S.C. at 145, 498 S.E.2d at 218).     
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The State maintains, and the court of appeals held, Burdette was not 
prejudiced by the trial court's erroneous inferred malice instruction (1) because 
Burdette was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and (2) since malice is not an 
element of voluntary manslaughter, the inclusion of the inferred malice instruction 
in the jury instruction on murder could not have contributed to the verdict. Burdette 
argues a reading of the jury charge as a whole compels the conclusion that the trial 
court's error was not harmless.  We agree with Burdette.   
The trial court's charge to the jury of the elements of murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter take up a mere six pages of the overall 
trial transcript. Absent a self-defense instruction, that is the typical length of this 
portion of the jury instruction. As is customary, the trial court first instructed the 
jury on the offense of murder, then the lesser-included offense of voluntary 
manslaughter, and then the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. 
In many instances, a lesser-included offense is deemed to exist because the 
lesser offense is "one whose elements are wholly contained within the crime 
charged." State v. Dickerson, 395 S.C. 101, 118, 716 S.E.2d 895, 904 (2011) (citing 
State v. Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 215, 641 S.E.2d 873, 877 (2007)). This is known 
as the "elements test." See Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 215, 641 S.E.2d at 877. In those 
cases, the trial court simply explains to the jury that the lesser offense includes all of 
the elements of the greater offense except for one or more elements, and the trial 
court then lists those elements that are not included in the lesser offense. In those 
cases, the trial court is able to explain the distinction between the greater and lesser 
offense in an orderly and very understandable fashion. For example, possession of 
cocaine is a lesser-included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute 
(PWID) because possession of cocaine contains all the elements of PWID except for 
the intent to distribute.    
In other instances, such as in the case at bar, one offense may be considered a 
lesser offense of another not by virtue of the elements test, but rather because it "has 
traditionally been considered a lesser included offense of the greater offense 
charged." Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 216, 641 S.E.2d at 877-78.  In those instances, the 
elements of the lesser offense are not "wholly contained" within the greater offense, 
and the trial court cannot simply list for the jury those elements not included in the 
lesser offense. Therefore, there is greater potential for jury confusion when the lesser 
offense has traditionally been considered a lesser offense of the greater offense. 
Because there is greater potential for jury confusion, there is a great need for clarity 
when the trial court explains the greater and lesser offenses to the jury.       
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Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser offense of murder not by virtue of the 
elements test, but because it has traditionally been considered a lesser offense of 
murder. Therefore, a trial court must allow the jury to consider the lesser offense of 
voluntary manslaughter if there is evidence from which it could be inferred that a 
defendant committed voluntary manslaughter rather than the greater offense of 
murder. "Voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are both lesser-included offenses 
of murder." State v. Sams, 410 S.C. 303, 309, 764 S.E.2d 511, 514 (2014). 
Obviously, neither of these offenses are considered lesser offenses of murder by 
virtue of the elements tests, as the elements of neither offense are "wholly contained" 
in the elements of murder.    
In State v. Scott, we repeated the general rule that involuntary manslaughter 
is "the unintentional killing of another without malice while engaged in either (1) 
the commission of some unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not naturally 
tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or (2) the doing of a lawful act with a 
reckless disregard for the safety of others." 414 S.C. 482, 487, 779 S.E.2d 529, 531 
(2015) (quoting Sams, 410 S.C. at 309, 764 S.E.2d at 514). Involuntary 
manslaughter mandates a showing of criminal negligence, defined as "the reckless 
disregard of the safety of others." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-60 (2015). "Recklessness 
is a state of mind in which the actor is aware of his or her conduct, yet consciously 
disregards a risk which his or her conduct is creating." State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 
527, 571, 647 S.E.2d 144, 167 (2007). 
When considering whether an incorrect jury instruction constitutes harmless 
error, we are required to review the trial court's charge to the jury in its entirety. See 
Stanko, 402 S.C. at 264, 741 S.E.2d at 714 ("Jury instructions should be considered 
as a whole, and if as a whole, they are free from error, any isolated portions which 
may be misleading do not constitute reversible error."). We will therefore review 
the trial court's instructions on the offenses of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and 
involuntary manslaughter. Because voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are 
lesser offenses of murder under the more cumbersome "traditional" test, it was 
particularly important for the trial court to clearly explain the elements of all three 
offenses in this case. 
As to the count of murder, the trial court charged the following points to the 
jury: the State must prove the defendant killed another person with malice 
aforethought; malice is hatred, ill will, or hostility towards another person; malice is 
the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse and with an 
intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances that the law will infer an evil intent; 
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malice need not exist for any particular time before the act is committed, but malice 
must exist in the mind of the defendant just before and at the time the act is  
committed; therefore, there must be a combination of the previous evil intent and the 
act; malice aforethought may be expressed or inferred, but the terms "expressed" or 
"inferred" do not mean different kinds of malice, but instead mean the manner in 
which the malice can be proven to have existed, and that is by direct or circumstantial 
evidence; "expressed malice" is shown when a person speaks words which express 
ill will or hatred for another, or when the person prepared beforehand to do the act 
which was later accomplished, with the examples being given of a person "lying in 
wait" for a person or other acts of preparation going to show that the deed was in the 
defendant's mind ahead of time; malice may be inferred from conduct showing a 
total disregard for human life; "inferred malice" may arise when the deed is done 
with a deadly weapon; the trial court defined "deadly weapon" and gave examples 
of deadly weapons. 
The trial court then instructed the jury that if it found the State failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed murder, it must consider 
whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court charged the 
following: the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant took 
the life of another person in the sudden heat of passion based on sufficient legal 
provocation; both heat of passion and sufficient legal provocation must be present at 
the time of the killing; sudden heat of passion may, for a time, affect a person's self-
control and temporarily disturb a person's reason; this sudden heat of passion must 
be the type that would make an ordinary person unable to coolly reflect on his actions 
and would produce an uncontrollable influence or impulse to do violence; sufficient 
legal provocation must be the type that would make a person of ordinary reason and 
caution become enraged and lose control temporarily; such provocation necessary 
for voluntary manslaughter must come from some act by the victim or related to the 
victim; words alone are insufficient to support legal provocation; where death is  
caused by the use of a deadly weapon, the words must be accompanied by some 
overt threatening act which could have produced the heat of passion; exercising a 
legal right, no matter how offensive it may be to another, is never sufficient legal 
provocation to support voluntary manslaughter; if the heat of passion cools or if there 
was enough time between the provocation and the killing for the passion of a 
reasonable person to cool, the killing would not be voluntary manslaughter; when 
considering whether a reasonable person would have had enough time to cool down 
or cool off, all of the circumstances surrounding the killing must be considered; it 
14 
is permissible to consider the nature of the provocation, if any, the defendant's 
mental and physical state, and the circumstances and relationship between the  
parties. 
Importantly however, the trial court did not explain to the jury that malice is 
not an element of voluntary manslaughter, despite section 16-3-50 of the South 
Carolina Code (2015) referring to "manslaughter" as "the unlawful killing of another 
without malice, express or implied."     
After concluding the voluntary manslaughter instruction, the trial court 
instructed the jury that if it found the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed murder or voluntary manslaughter, it must consider 
whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. Specifically, the trial court 
instructed the jury: the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant unintentionally killed the victim "without malice" but while engaged in 
an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or that 
the defendant unintentionally killed the victim without malice while engaged in a 
lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others; "unintentional" means 
the defendant did not intend for anyone to be killed or seriously injured; "reckless 
disregard for the safety of others" requires more than mere negligence or 
carelessness; "mere negligence" or "carelessness" is the failure to use the care that a 
person of ordinary reason would use under the same or similar circumstances; 
"recklessness" is a conscious failure to use ordinary care; exercising "reckless 
disregard for the safety of others" means that one is not interested in the 
consequences of his acts or the rights and safety of others; if a person who knows or 
should know that ordinary care requires certain precautions to be taken for the safety 
of others when using a dangerous instrumentality such as a gun or car, but that person 
fails to use those precautions without concern, the person's actions are considered 
reckless; the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's act 
was the proximate cause of death; "proximate cause" is direct, immediate, and 
efficient cause; "proximate cause" is the cause without which the death of the person 
would not have resulted; there must be a chain of causation from the time of the 
injury inflicted by the defendant until the time of the victim's death; proximate cause 
does not necessarily mean that it occurred immediately prior to the victim's death. 
The trial court twice instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter but did not 
include the fact that it is a killing without malice. The trial court twice instructed 
the jury that involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of another without 
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malice. Burdette contends that while the trial court correctly charged the law of  
involuntary manslaughter, the trial court should have similarly instructed the jury 
that malice is not an element of voluntary manslaughter. Burdette claims the charge 
as a whole likely led the jury to incorrectly believe that malice is an element of 
voluntary manslaughter. Consequently, Burdette argues, the jury was left with the 
impression that it could use the inference of malice deriving from the use of a deadly 
weapon as a basis for convicting him of voluntary manslaughter. 
After consideration of the jury instructions as a whole, we are compelled to 
agree with Burdette.  When the trial court instructed the jury that malice was not an 
element of involuntary manslaughter, but did not instruct the jury that malice was 
not an element of voluntary manslaughter, the jury was left with the incorrect 
impression that malice is an element of voluntary manslaughter, which allowed the 
jury to use the improperly charged inference of malice from the use of a deadly 
weapon to find Burdette guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The prejudice stemming 
from the erroneous and confusing instructions was compounded when, during 
deliberations, the jury requested the trial court to provide a "better understanding" 
of the charges of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter, 
and the trial court repeated its original instructions which (1) included the erroneous 
inferred malice instruction and (2) did not include an instruction that malice is not 
an element of voluntary manslaughter. The charge as a whole necessarily resulted 
in confusion that contributed to the verdict that Burdette was guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter. Therefore, we cannot conclude the trial court's erroneous instruction 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.       
B. Continuing Validity of the Inferred Malice Instruction in South 
Carolina 
In Belcher, we held the trial court could no longer give the inferred malice 
from the use of a deadly weapon charge in cases in which evidence was presented 
that would reduce, mitigate, excuse, or justify a homicide or an assault and battery 
with the intent to kill. 385 S.C. at 612, 685 S.E.2d at 810. We now consider whether 
the permissive inference charge may be given in any setting, even those in which no 
evidence is presented that would reduce, mitigate, excuse, or justify the commission 
of an offense containing the element of malice. We have held in other settings that 
it is improper to give examples of conduct the jury may consider when determining 
whether the State has proven an element of a crime or when determining whether 
certain other facts have been proven or disproven. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 275 S.C. 
404, 407-08, 272 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1980) (holding it was improper for the trial judge 
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to charge the jury that the defendant's flight may be considered as evidence of guilt); 
State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 452, 529 S.E.2d 721, 728 (2000) (holding, in a 
voluntary manslaughter case, the trial court correctly refused the defendant's request 
to charge the jury specific examples of conduct that might be considered as evidence 
of legal provocation, as the giving of such examples would be an impermissible 
charge on the facts), overruled on other grounds by Rosemond v. Catoe, 383 S.C. 
320, 680 S.E.2d 5 (2009); State v. Cheeks, 401 S.C. 322, 328-29, 737 S.E.2d 480, 
484 (2013) (holding, in a drug trafficking case, that the trial court must not charge 
the jury that actual knowledge of the presence of a drug is strong evidence of a 
defendant's intent to control its disposition or use).    
In Cheeks, we noted, "Simply because certain facts may be considered by the 
jury as evidence of guilt in a given case where the circumstances warrant, it does not 
follow that [the jury] should be charged that these facts are probative of guilt. It is 
always for the jury to determine the facts, and the inferences that are to be drawn 
from these facts." 401 S.C. at 328, 737 S.E.2d at 484. When the trial court tells the 
jury it may use evidence of the use of a deadly weapon to establish the existence of 
malice, a critical element of the charge of murder, the trial court has directly 
commented upon facts in evidence, elevated those facts, and emphasized them to the 
jury. Even telling the jury that it is to give evidence of the use of a deadly weapon 
only the weight the jury determines it should be given does not remove the taint of 
the trial court's injection of its commentary upon that evidence. Such an instruction 
is no different than an instruction that the jury may use evidence of flight as evidence 
of guilt. A jury instruction that malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly 
weapon is an improper court-sponsored emphasis of a fact in evidence—that the 
deed was done with a deadly weapon—and it should no longer be permitted.   
We decide this issue solely under the common law; pursuant to our policy-
making role under the common law, we hold, regardless of the evidence presented 
at trial, a trial court shall not instruct the jury that it may infer the existence of malice 
when the deed was done with a deadly weapon. Of course, whether the deed was 
done with a deadly weapon or not, the State and the defendant are free to argue the 
existence or nonexistence of malice based on the evidence in the record. For 
example, if evidence is introduced that the deed was done with a deadly weapon, the 
State is free to argue to the jury that it should infer the existence of malice based on 
that fact and any other facts that would naturally and logically allow a jury to 
17 
conclude the defendant acted with malice aforethought.2 Similarly, if the deed was 
not done with a deadly weapon, a defendant is free to argue the absence of malice 
based on that fact and any other facts that would naturally and logically allow a jury 
to conclude the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
acted without malice aforethought. "It is axiomatic that some matters appropriate 
for jury argument are not proper for charging. 'Do jurors need the court's permission 
to infer something? The answer is, of course not.'" Belcher, 385 S.C. at 612 n.9, 
685 S.E.2d at 810 n.9 (quoting Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Art of Malice, 60 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 435, 476 (2008)). 
Of course, our ruling does not prohibit a trial court from citing outside the 
presence of the jury the proposition that malice may be inferred from the use of a 
deadly weapon. For example, when ruling on a defendant's motion for directed 
verdict on the ground the State failed to prove the element of malice, a trial court 
may take into account the fact that the deed was done with a deadly weapon.         
IV. CONCLUSION 
We hold the trial court's erroneous inferred malice instruction was not  
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse Burdette's convictions and remand 
for a new trial on the charges of voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon 
during the commission of a violent crime. Because Burdette was acquitted of 
murder, he cannot be retried for murder. See State v. Parker, 391 S.C. 606, 612, 707 
S.E.2d 799, 801 (2011) (providing that pursuant to the law of double jeopardy, a 
defendant may not be prosecuted for the same offense after an acquittal).   
We further overrule our precedent to the extent it permits a jury instruction 
that malice may be inferred from the defendant's use of a deadly weapon.3 
2 However, we repeat our comment in State v. Cartwright: "We do not suggest there 
are no limits to a party's jury argument, for the law provides limits, as enhanced by 
Due Process protections." 425 S.C. 81, 93 n.3, 819 S.E.2d 756, 762 n.3 (2018). 
3 Our decision today overrules in part a considerable amount of South Carolina case 
law. We overrule those cases insofar as it can be construed that we have approved 
a trial court's charge that a jury may infer the existence of  malice from the 
defendant's use of a deadly weapon.  The following represents a non-exhaustive list 
of such cases: Gibson v. State, 416 S.C. 260, 786 S.E.2d 121 (2016); State v. Stanko, 
402 S.C. 252, 741 S.E.2d 708 (2013); State v. Belcher, 385 S.C. 597, 685 S.E.2d 802 
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Regardless of the evidence presented at trial, trial courts shall not instruct a jury that 
the element of malice may be inferred when the deed is done with a deadly weapon.  
Our ruling today is effective in this case and in those cases which are pending on 
direct review or are not yet final, so long as the issue is preserved. See Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding "a new rule for the conduct of criminal 
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . pending on direct review 
or not yet final"). However, today's ruling will not apply to convictions challenged 
on post-conviction relief. See Belcher, 385 S.C. at 613, 685 S.E.2d at 810 (citing 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, and FEW, JJ., concur. 
(2009); Sheppard v. State, 357 S.C. 646, 594 S.E.2d 462 (2004); Gibson v. State, 
355 S.C. 429, 586 S.E.2d 119 (2003); Tate v. State, 351 S.C. 418, 570 S.E.2d 522 
(2002); State v. Harvin, 345 S.C. 190, 547 S.E.2d 497 (2001); State v. Von Dohlen, 
322 S.C. 234, 471 S.E.2d 689 (1996); Plyler v. State, 309 S.C. 408, 424 S.E.2d 477 
(1992); Carter v. State, 301 S.C. 396, 392 S.E.2d 184 (1990); State v. Smith, 288 
S.C. 329, 342 S.E.2d 600 (1986); State v. Peterson, 287 S.C. 244, 335 S.E.2d 800 
(1985); State v. Lucas, 285 S.C. 37, 328 S.E.2d 63 (1985); State v. Campbell, 287 
S.C. 377, 339 S.E.2d 109 (1985); State v. Woods, 282 S.C. 18, 316 S.E.2d 673 
(1984); State v. Jennings, 280 S.C. 62, 309 S.E.2d 759 (1983); State v. Elmore, 279 
S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781 (1983); State v. Koon, 278 S.C. 528, 298 S.E.2d 769 
(1982); State v. Friend, 276 S.C. 552, 281 S.E.2d 106 (1981); State v. Hyman, 276 
S.C. 559, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981); State v. Crocker, 272 S.C. 344, 251 S.E.2d 764 
(1979); State v. Robinson, 149 S.C. 439, 147 S.E. 441 (1929); State v. Portee, 122 
S.C. 298, 115 S.E. 238 (1922); State v. Jackson, 36 S.C. 487, 15 S.E. 559 (1892); 
State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1891); State v. King, 412 S.C. 403, 772 
S.E.2d 189 (Ct. App. 2015); State v. Frazier, 401 S.C. 224, 736 S.E.2d 301 (Ct. App. 
2013); State v. Price, 400 S.C. 110, 732 S.E.2d 652 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Kinard, 
373 S.C. 500, 646 S.E.2d 168 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Franklin, 310 S.C. 122, 425 
S.E.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Merriman, 287 S.C. 74, 337 S.E.2d 218 (Ct. 
App. 1985). We have not included the cases that were previously overruled by 
Belcher. 
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JUSTICE JAMES: This case stems from the post-conviction relief (PCR) court's 
denial of relief to Derrick Fishburne. Because the PCR court's order contains no 
findings of fact as to one of Fishburne's primary PCR claims, we remand this matter 
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to the PCR court for the PCR court to issue an order setting forth adequate findings 
of fact and conclusions of law regarding Fishburne's unaddressed PCR claim. In 
doing so, we again stress that PCR orders must be prepared in compliance with 
section 17-27-80 of the South Carolina Code (2014) and Rule 52(a) of the South 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
During the early morning hours of April 10, 2009, law enforcement responded 
to a 911 call reporting a shooting at Spirits Lounge in Walterboro.  A patrol officer 
arrived on scene and observed a man (Victim) lying in a pool of blood on the 
pavement outside the front of the club. Victim was transported to the hospital, but 
he did not survive.  An autopsy determined Victim's cause of death was six gunshot 
wounds. 
During law enforcement's investigation, two eyewitnesses identified 
Fishburne as the shooter.  These eyewitnesses first identified Fishburne by name and 
subsequently identified him in a lineup.  Law enforcement arrested Fishburne when 
he appeared at the local courthouse for roll call in an unrelated matter. Fishburne 
gave law enforcement a statement in which he denied being at the club on the night 
of the murder, claiming to have stayed the night at his girlfriend's house. This was 
not the truth. Fishburne's girlfriend told law enforcement he left her house around 
12:45 a.m. (before the shooting occurred) and did not return until approximately 
3:00 a.m. (after the shooting occurred). Another witness, Jarrod Frazier, testified he 
saw Fishburne at the club and thought Fishburne might have left before the shooting, 
but was not sure. In his written statement to law enforcement, Frazier stated he saw 
Fishburne leaving the club's parking lot in an SUV about 10-15 minutes before the 
shooting occurred. Frazier admitted on cross-examination he gave the exculpatory 
written statement to law enforcement so Fishburne "could get a bond."     
Fishburne was indicted for murder and possession of a weapon during the 
commission of a violent crime.  At trial, Fishburne's trial counsel said the following 
during his opening statement to the jury—all relevant to one of Fishburne's 
underlying PCR claims: 
I think the evidence will show that [law enforcement] made a decision 
that before the morning was out, once they had the name Derrick 
Fishburne, once they had that name, they had their guy. I think the 
evidence will show they picked him up from roll call on Friday, the  
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next day.  He was already in court.  He might qualify as a usual suspect.  
He was an easy guy for them to get, because he was in court anyway.  
They picked him up from roll call on April the 10th, and they took him 
back to the Sheriff's Office Annex and they interviewed him. Now, 
because he had involvement with them before, I think the evidence will 
show he said, "I wasn't there." I think the evidence will show that  
there's a long video tape and you will have a chance to look at that. 
He said, "I'm not saying anything," pretty much. "I wasn't there. I don't 
know what you're talking about." And at the end of the interview, they 
arrested him. One of the things he told me was, "I was at my girlfriend's 
house all night.  I was at Lorinda Williams' -- Penny Williams' house," 
and I think the evidence will show that they went and checked with 
Penny, that he was not there. That he had, in fact, left the house at some 
time during a time when he could have been at the club, and I think the 
evidence will show from different witnesses, I think the State will be 
able to prove that he was, in fact, at the club. But they arrested him 
before they checked that out. I think the evidence will show that he was 
arrested at the end of that interview and they didn't check out Penny's 
story until later.  It didn't check out.  He told a lie. 
Further, during closing arguments, Fishburne's trial counsel argued: 
[Fishburne] was rounded up and the testimony of Detective Williams 
was that they picked him up from roll call. He is one of the usual 
suspects.  He had been at roll call, so he already had some trouble. They 
knew him. They took him from here and took him down to the station 
and Detective Williams told you, he was already under arrest at that  
time. He was under arrest for murder and it really didn't matter what 
he said. 
One of the things also, what Detective Johnson said in the tape that you 
got to see is that [Fishburne's] brother is in prison. This is not a pretty 
fact, but it's the truth of the matter. The Fishburnes had trouble; it's a 
fact. So what does that mean to [Fishburne]? What does that mean to 
anybody being rounded up and taken down to the Sheriff's Office to get 
a statement? Do you think you're going to get a fair trial? He was 
already under arrest and it -- yeah, they checked out his story and it 
didn't check out, but if he was already under arrest, it didn't matter.   
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The jury convicted Fishburne as indicted. The trial court sentenced Fishburne 
to concurrent prison terms of forty years for murder and five years for possession of 
a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The court of appeals dismissed 
Fishburne's direct appeal following Anders1 briefing. State v. Fishburne, Op. No. 
2012-UP-363 (S.C. Ct. App. filed June 20, 2012). 
Fishburne filed an application for PCR, and his hearing was held on October 
27, 2014. Prior to the commencement of the hearing, Fishburne specified his alleged 
grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel's failure to 
properly investigate potential alibi witnesses and (2) ineffective assistance of 
counsel for trial counsel introducing other bad act evidence into the trial and  
characterizing  him  as one of  the  "usual suspects."  The State objected to the 
amendment because Fishburne did not "enumerate these allegations with specificity 
in his application." After Fishburne explained he had alerted the State to these 
specific allegations over a year ago via email, the PCR court permitted the 
amendment. 
Trial counsel testified Fishburne's statement to law enforcement that he was 
not at the club was problematic because the State had several witnesses who would 
testify Fishburne was indeed at the club. Trial counsel testified Fishburne explained 
law enforcement had harassed him in the past and that he did not think law 
enforcement would believe his side of the story anyway. Trial counsel explained his 
decision to refer to Fishburne as a "usual suspect" as follows: 
Trial Counsel: Well, I had to -- I tried to find a way to explain why he 
lied to the police. You know, you've got somebody that has you leaving 
the scene before this happens, so why would you deny that you're there?  
And you know, you don't need to do that; and it's a lie, and it's an 
unnecessary lie. And so, how do you explain that?  You've got to give 
the jury -- in my -- my strategy, you've got to give the -- you can't --
juries don't like lies, whether the police tell them or the defendants tell 
them or whether witnesses tell them, and you've got to explain it, 
somehow. And that was my way to explain why he would lie about 
being in the club. 
1 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
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PCR Counsel: Okay. It's safe to say that that's sort of a double-edged 
sword. Is that --
Trial Counsel:  Yes, it's a risk. 
PCR Counsel:  Okay. 
Trial Counsel: There's no doubt. I mean, you -- you want to present 
some evidence that, you know, somebody doesn't trust the police, then 
you have to show prior involvement with the police, which, normally, 
you work to try not to do. But, yeah, it's a risk. But I don't know how 
-- but you've got to explain a lie. 
Trial counsel admitted he did not pursue additional alibi witnesses that could 
have testified to Fishburne leaving the club before the shooting. Trial counsel 
testified he strategically decided to not present additional alibi witnesses to say 
Fishburne left the club over an hour before the shooting because he already had a 
witness he believed would testify that Fishburne left shortly before the shooting. 
Other than trial counsel, Fishburne was the only witness at the PCR hearing.  
He testified he was at the club that evening but left prior to the shooting. He testified 
he gave trial counsel the names of multiple alibi witnesses and that trial counsel 
failed to contact them. None of these purported alibi witnesses were present at the 
PCR hearing.     
The PCR court denied Fishburne relief in a written order. After setting forth 
the procedural history of Fishburne's case and reciting the Strickland2 standard, the 
PCR court set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law on Fishburne's claim trial 
counsel failed to call alibi witnesses. However, there is no discussion at all of 
Fishburne's claim arising from trial counsel's mention of Fishburne being at roll call 
for another criminal charge and trial counsel's characterization of Fishburne as a 
"usual suspect." Fishburne did not file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP motion asking the PCR 
court to rule on this issue. We granted Fishburne's petition for a writ of certiorari to 
2 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984) (providing a PCR 
applicant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show (1) counsel's 
performance was deficient and (2) counsel's deficiency prejudiced the applicant to 
the extent "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different"). 
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address whether his case should be remanded to the PCR court to make sufficient 
findings of fact as mandated by statute.   
DISCUSSION  
In ruling on a PCR application, "[t]he [PCR] court shall make specific findings 
of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented." 
S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 (2014). The South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 
apply to PCR matters. See id.; Rule 71.1(a), SCRCP. Rule 52(a) provides in 
pertinent part, "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . , the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon." Rule 
52(a), SCRCP. "The PCR court's general denial of all claims not specifically 
addressed in the PCR court's order 'does not constitute a sufficient ruling on any 
issues since it does not set forth specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.'"  
Simmons v. State, 416 S.C. 584, 592, 788 S.E.2d 220, 225 (2016) (quoting Marlar 
v. State, 375 S.C. 407, 409, 653 S.E.2d 266, 266 (2007)).    
We agree with Fishburne that the PCR court erred by not making any findings 
of fact or conclusions of law regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
for trial counsel's reference to him being at roll call to answer to another criminal 
charge and his characterization of Fishburne as a "usual suspect." Over the years, 
we have issued numerous opinions addressing a PCR court's failure to make 
adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding duly raised issues. In 
McCray v. State, the PCR court dismissed the applicant's claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel without making any findings of fact on the specific allegations 
raised. 305 S.C. 329, 330, 408 S.E.2d 241, 241 (1991). We reversed and remanded, 
holding: "The PCR court's conclusions regarding ineffective assistance are 
insufficient for appellate review and fail to meet the standard set forth in  [section  
17-27-80]."  Id. 
 In Pruitt v. State , the applicant raised several claims for relief in his PCR 
application and presented evidence regarding those claims during the PCR hearing.  
310 S.C. 254, 255, 423 S.E.2d 127, 127-28 (1992). The PCR court's order did not 
address the applicant's claims. We vacated the PCR court's order denying relief and 
remanded the matter to the PCR court to hold a new hearing. We noted, "[W]e are 
not abandoning the general rule that issues must be raised to, and ruled on by, the 
post-conviction judge to be preserved for appellate review. The extraordinary action 
we take today is necessary only because our opinion in McCray is not being 
followed." Id. at 255 n.2, 423 S.E.2d at 128 n.2.  We further explained: 
25 
We take this opportunity to express our concern with the increasing 
number of orders in PCR proceedings that fail to address the merits of 
the issues raised by the applicant. Not only does this deprive the parties 
of rulings on the issues raised, but it makes review by the appellate 
court more difficult and ultimately increases the work load of all 
involved where, as in this case, a new hearing is required to secure the 
rulings which should have been made initially. Counsel preparing 
proposed orders should be meticulous in doing so, opposing counsel 
should call any omissions to the attention of the PCR judge prior to 
issuance of the order, and the PCR judge should carefully review the 
order prior to signing it. Even after an order is filed, counsel has an 
obligation to review the order and file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to 
alter or amend if the order fails to set forth the findings and the reasons 
for those findings as required by § 17-27-80 and Rule 52(a), SCRCP. 
Id. at 255-56, 423 S.E.2d at 128; see also McCullough v. State, 320 S.C. 270, 272, 
464 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1995) ("Although the error was not raised to and ruled on by 
the PCR judge, we find it necessary to vacate the order and remand this matter to the 
circuit court to issue an order addressing its decision to dismiss [the applicant's] 
second application as successive."); Bryson v. State, 328 S.C. 236, 236-37, 493 
S.E.2d 500, 500 (1997) (vacating the order of dismissal and remanding to the PCR 
court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law for each issue properly 
raised by the applicant). 
 In  Humbert v. State, the applicant argued he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel when trial counsel allowed him to appear at trial while wearing a jail 
uniform, shackles, and an identification bracelet bearing his mug shot. 345 S.C. 332, 
334, 548 S.E.2d 862, 863 (2001). The PCR court did not rule specifically as to 
whether trial counsel was ineffective for proceeding to trial while the applicant was 
wearing shackles and the identification bracelet. Id. at 337, 548 S.E.2d at 865. 
Because the applicant did not file a Rule 59(e) motion requesting a ruling on these 
issues, we held the issues were not preserved for review.  Id. 
 In  Marlar v. State, the applicant raised several issues to the PCR court, and 
the PCR court's order failed to specifically address any of the issues raised by the 
applicant. 375 S.C. 407, 408, 653 S.E.2d 266, 266 (2007). The applicant did not 
file a Rule 59(e) motion but petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing the PCR 
court's order was inadequate and that his case should be remanded for specific 
findings of fact. The court of appeals vacated the PCR court's order and remanded 
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the matter for a new hearing, stressing the need for the PCR court to make specific 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each issue raised in the PCR application.  
In doing so, the court of  appeals  rejected the State's argument  that none of the 
applicant's allegations were preserved because of the applicant's failure to  make a  
Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment to include specific findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The court of appeals reasoned that this Court, in the past, 
had remanded PCR actions to the PCR court for specific rulings, despite the fact  
there were no Rule 59(e) motions filed. 
We reversed the court of appeals' decision, explaining: 
The cases this Court remanded for specific findings were unique cases 
in which the Court attempted to remind circuit court judges and parties 
that: (1) specific findings of fact and conclusions of law were required; 
and (2) a Rule 59(e) motion must be filed if issues are not adequately 
addressed in order to preserve the issues for appellate review. Although 
the cases apparently have not accomplished the Court's goal, they do 
not change the general rule that issues which are not properly preserved 
will not be addressed on appeal. 
Id. at 410, 653 S.E.2d at 267. We held that because the applicant failed to make a 
Rule 59(e) motion asking the PCR court to make specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on his allegations, the issues were unpreserved, and the court of 
appeals erred by addressing the merits of the issues and remanding the case to the 
PCR court. Id. 
 In  Simmons v. State, the PCR court vacated the applicant's death sentence but 
summarily denied all of his remaining claims, including a challenge to DNA 
evidence, finding the claims to be "without merit." 416 S.C. 584, 591, 788 S.E.2d 
220, 224 (2016). Although the applicant failed to file a Rule 59(e) motion to request 
a ruling on the summarily denied issues, we noted "that although the State is 
technically correct [(in arguing the applicant's claims were not preserved)], we also 
believe dismissing the writ of certiorari would be fundamentally contrary to the 
interests of justice. . . . [O]ur jurisprudence permits a remand under such 
extraordinary circumstances." Id. We emphasized remands should be granted 
"sparingly" and should be "reserved for the rarest of cases." Id. at 593, 788 S.E.2d 
at 225. We remanded the matter to the PCR court for a new hearing on the DNA 
claim.  Id. at 593-94, 788 S.E.2d at 225.  
27 
Last year, we issued an order holding the PCR court erred by signing an 
inadequate PCR order and by denying the applicant's Rule 59(e) motion. See Reese 
v. State, 425 S.C. 108, 111, 820 S.E.2d 376, 378 (2018). Citing numerous cases, we 
noted, "This is not the first time this Court has raised concerns over orders . . . that 
do not comply with section 17-27-80 and Rule 52(a)." Id. at 109-11, 820 S.E.2d at 
377-78. We vacated both PCR orders and remanded the case to the PCR court for 
the entry of "a new PCR order that complies with the law." Id. at 111, 820 S.E.2d 
at 378. 
The State argues Fishburne's failure to file a Rule 59(e) motion precludes 
appellate review. See Marlar, 375 S.C. at 410, 653 S.E.2d at 267 (providing "a Rule 
59(e) motion must be filed if issues are not adequately addressed" in the PCR order).  
We acknowledge the validity of the State's preservation argument, and we 
acknowledge our prior decisions have been somewhat inconsistent as to whether a 
Rule 59(e) motion is required to preserve an applicant's request to remand to the 
PCR court for the consideration of particular issues in which the PCR court failed to 
make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. If this were a generic civil 
action, we would likely be quick to accept the State's preservation argument. 
However, because the United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantee to a 
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is engrained in PCR cases, we 
cannot continue to permit a party's procedural shortcoming—such as the failure to 
file a Rule 59(e) motion—to prevent this Court from remanding claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel when the PCR court's order does not comply with section 17-
27-80. 
We do not place the blame on a single party below for an insufficient PCR 
order. The preparation and finalization of a PCR order is often a collaborative effort.  
We recognize the prevailing party often prepares a proposed order for the PCR court. 
See Hall v. Catoe, 360 S.C. 353, 365, 601 S.E.2d 335, 341 (2004) ("[I]t is common 
practice for judges to ask a party to draft a proposed order for the sake of 
efficiency."). When counsel for either side prepares the proposed order, the order 
must include findings of fact and conclusions of law as to all issues raised by an 
applicant. A copy of the proposed order should be transmitted to opposing counsel.  
Opposing counsel should promptly review the proposed order and alert preparing 
counsel and the PCR court as to any deficiencies in the proposed order. Because the 
PCR judge will ultimately be signing the order, the PCR judge must carefully review 
the proposed order to ensure it includes appropriate findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as to all issues raised. Once a proposed order is finalized, signed by the PCR 
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judge, filed, and served upon the parties, the parties should thoroughly review the 
final order to make sure all issues raised were adequately addressed as required by 
section 17-27-80 and Rule 52(a); if they were not, a timely Rule 59(e) motion should 
be filed, requesting the PCR court to address the appropriate issues. When these 
steps are ignored on the front end, we find ourselves having to remand a case, as we 
do today. 
In remanding to the PCR court, we do not dictate the conclusions the PCR 
court should reach. We simply require the PCR court to set forth appropriate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, whatever they may be.  As we stated almost 
thirty years ago in Pruitt, "We are confident that in the future all those involved in 
post-conviction matters will do everything in their power to ensure that remands 
such as the one we order today will no longer be necessary." 310 S.C. at 256, 423 
S.E.2d at 128. 
CONCLUSION 
We remand to the PCR court for the issuance of a supplemental order setting 
forth findings of fact and conclusions of law on the PCR ground that was not 
addressed in the original order. The supplemental PCR order shall be entered within 
forty-five days of this Court's mailing of the remittitur. Following the issuance of 
the supplemental PCR order (and a ruling on any post-hearing motions that may 
thereafter be filed), the aggrieved party may serve and file a new notice of appeal.    
REMANDED.  
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE and FEW, JJ., concur. HEARN, J., concurring 
in a separate opinion in which JAMES, J., concurs. 
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JUSTICE HEARN: I concur but write separately to emphasize the importance of 
filing a Rule 59(e) motion to preserve an issue for appellate review. I caution the 
bench and the bar not to read our decision as relaxing this requirement in the PCR 
context. Our rules do not expressly carve out any such exception, and therefore, 
appellate courts should avoid selectively applying them in PCR. Although we have 
overlooked the lack of a Rule 59(e) motion in the past, as the majority discusses, 
those decisions clearly represent extraordinary circumstances. Our issue 
preservation requirements are well-settled and serve to enable both parties to raise 
issues and allow courts an opportunity to rule on them. Herron v. Century BMW, 
395 S.C. 461, 465, 719 S.E.2d 640, 642 (2011). Fairness dictates that we apply these 
rules in a consistent manner, departing from this approach only in exceptional 
circumstances—lest the exception swallow the general rule. While the wisdom of 
foregoing the need to file a Rule 59(e) motion to preserve an issue in PCR is not 
before us, if there is a sentiment to abandon this procedural requirement, then the 
appropriate course is to submit a proposed rule change to the General Assembly for 
its approval. 
I agree that PCR implicates the Sixth Amendment, as it is the avenue for 
challenging such alleged constitutional violations that occurred at trial. However, I 
do not believe this fact alone requires us to address an issue that is clearly 
unpreserved. PCR is a creature of statute and governed by the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act. See Robertson v. State, 418 S.C. 505, 513, 795 S.E.2d 
29, 33 (2016) ("The South Carolina Legislature enacted the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act to govern all aspects of PCR . . . ."). It is this statutory 
scheme that affords the right to counsel in PCR, not the constitution. See Turner v. 
State, 384 S.C. 451, 456 n.5, 682 S.E.2d 792, 794 n.5 (2009) ("[T]he right to PCR 
counsel arises from Rule 71.1, SCRCP, and not from the constitution."). While we 
certainly apply Sixth Amendment principles in PCR,3 because the statute affords this 
right, I do not believe it is inherently unfair to follow our issue preservation rules 
uniformly. Accordingly, in most instances where a party fails to file a Rule 59(e) 
motion when required to do so, we will find the issue unpreserved and decline to 
address the merits. Nonetheless, I join the majority because it is necessary once again 
3 See, e.g., Hilton v. State, 422 S.C. 204, 208, 810 S.E.2d 852, 854 (2018) (noting 
the Prince and Faretta framework apply in a PCR setting where the applicant sought 
to waive his statutory right to counsel). 
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to remind the State, opposing counsel, and the circuit court of the need for orders 
that contain specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
JAMES, J., concurs. 
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THOMAS, J.:  George Glassmeyer appeals the circuit court's order granting 
declaratory and injunctive relief in this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case.    
On appeal, Glassmeyer argues the circuit court erred by (1) failing to address his 
counterclaims, (2) entering judgment on the pleadings, (3) finding the South  
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Carolina Lottery Commission (SCLC) had standing to bring the action, and (4) 
failing to grant his motion to dismiss.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and 
remand.  
On March 31, 2014, Glassmeyer submitted a FOIA request to SCLC for 
information related to any claims for any South Carolina lottery prize equal to or 
greater than one million dollars in gross proceeds from March 1, 2013, to March 
20, 2014. Specifically, Glassmeyer requested (1) the claimants' full names, (2) the 
claimants' complete addresses, (3) the claimants' telephone numbers, (4) the gross 
dollar amount of the claims, (5) the dates of the claims, and (6) a copy of any form 
of identification SCLC obtained from the claimants.  On April 1, 2014, SCLC 
mailed letters to the claimants who were affected by the FOIA request.  Many of 
the claimants objected to the release of their personal information and filed 
complaints against SCLC.  On April 4, 2014, one of the claimants, "John Doe," 
requested the circuit court to grant a permanent injunction enjoining SCLC from 
disclosing Doe's name, address, telephone number, amount of claim, date of claim, 
and any forms of identification obtained for the claim.1 
SCLC then responded to Glassmeyer's request on April 16, 2014.  In sum, SCLC 
informed Glassmeyer that (1) the request for the claimants' full names, complete 
addresses, telephone numbers, and forms of identification were exempted from 
disclosure by section 30-2-310 (A)(1)(e) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018)2 
and, therefore, were exempted from disclosure under section 30-4-40(a)(4) of the 
South Carolina Code (2007)3; (2) the request for copies of the claimants' forms of 
identification, such as their driver's licenses, were not public records under FOIA; 
and (3) SCLC could not disclose an individual's personal identifying information 
1 The record only includes the full disposition of Doe's case, John Doe v. South 
Carolina Lottery Commission, Civil Action No. 2014-CP-40-2446. The record 
does not contain information regarding the outcomes of the other cases involving 
the claimants who filed complaints against SCLC.   
2 Section 30-2-310(A)(1)(e) provides, in pertinent part, that a public body may not 
"intentionally communicate or otherwise make available to the general public an 
individual's social security number or a portion of it containing six digits or more 
or other personal identifying information." 
3 Section 30-4-40(a)(4) provides, "A public body may but is not required to exempt 
from disclosure . . . [m]atters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute or 
law." 
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because it would be an invasion of privacy.  However, SCLC did disclose the 
following information to Glassmeyer: the gross dollar amount of the claims, dates 
of the claims, the hometowns and states of the claimants, and the games associated 
with the prizes won. 
Glassmeyer submitted two more FOIA requests in letters dated April 16 and April 
17, 2014. Glassmeyer stated that the response he received from SCLC on April 16 
"did not satisfy my request." (emphasis in original).  Again, Glassmeyer requested 
that SCLC provide him with the "claimants' full names."   
Meanwhile, Doe's action against SCLC proceeded forward in the circuit court.  
The circuit court found that 
[Doe] therefore is entitled to a declaratory judgment that 
the release of all or any part of [Doe's] personal 
identifying information, such as [claimant's] name, would 
result in an unreasonable invasion of [Doe's] personal 
privacy in accordance with Section 30-4-40(a)(2).4 
Thus, on April 25, 2014, the court granted a permanent injunction and ordered that 
SCLC be "permanently restrained and enjoined from releasing any and all 
4 Section 30-4-40(a)(2) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018) provides, "A 
public body may but is not required to exempt from disclosure . . . [i]nformation of 
a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would constitute 
unreasonable invasion of personal privacy.  Information of a personal nature shall 
include, but not be limited to, information as to gross receipts contained in 
applications for business licenses, information relating to public records which 
include the name, address, and telephone number or other such information of an 
individual or individuals who are handicapped or disabled when the information is 
requested for person-to-person commercial solicitation of handicapped persons 
solely by virtue of their handicap, and any audio recording of the final statements 
of a dying victim in a call to 911 emergency services.  Any audio of the victim's 
statements must be redacted prior to the release of the recording unless the privacy 
interest is waived by the victim's next of kin.  This provision must not be 
interpreted to restrict access by the public and press to information contained in 
public records." 
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information regarding [Doe] in response to the FOIA request of Mr. George 
Glassmeyer and any other FOIA request."5 
Thereafter, in a letter dated May 7, 2014, SCLC responded to Glassmeyer's April 
16 and April 17 requests. SCLC granted Glassmeyer's request pertaining to 
information that it determined was disclosable, but informed Glassmeyer that his 
request for the claimants' full names would constitute an unreasonable invasion of 
personal privacy and this information was exempt under section 30-4-40(a)(2).  On 
that same day, SCLC filed a summons and complaint against Glassmeyer 
requesting the court grant declaratory judgment and injunctive relief "with respect 
to the release of personal information regarding claimants of lottery winnings," 
which resulted in the present appeal.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable, but is determined by 
the nature of the underlying issue." Felts v. Richland Cty., 303 S.C. 354, 356, 400 
S.E.2d 781, 782 (1991). "In equitable actions, the appellate court may find facts in 
accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence."  Id.  "In law 
actions, the lower court must be affirmed where there is 'any evidence' to support 
its findings." Id.  "An issue [that is] essentially one at law will not be transformed 
into one in equity simply because declaratory relief is sought." Id.  "A declaratory 
judgment action under the FOIA to determine whether certain information should 
be disclosed is an action at law." Burton v. York Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 358 S.C. 339, 
346, 594 S.E.2d 888, 892 (Ct. App. 2004).  The appellate court reviews questions 
of law de novo. See Glassmeyer v. City of Columbia, 414 S.C. 213, 218, 777 
S.E.2d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2015). 
STANDING  
Glassmeyer argues SCLC did not have standing under FOIA to file this action 
because the statute indicates only citizens may apply to the circuit court for a 
declaratory judgment or injunction.  We disagree. 
5 This order only addressed Doe's rights and how releasing his personal 
information would affect him.   
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"To have standing, one must have a personal stake in the subject matter of the 
lawsuit. In other words, one must be a real party in interest."  Sea Pines Ass'n for 
the Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res., 345 S.C. 594, 600, 550 S.E.2d 
287, 291 (2001). "Standing may be acquired: (1) by statute; (2) through the rubric 
of 'constitutional standing;' or (3) under the 'public importance' exception."  ATC 
S., Inc. v. Charleston Cty., 380 S.C. 191, 195, 669 S.E.2d 337, 339 (2008).  The 
FOIA statute specifically "contains a civil enforcement provision granting standing 
to a South Carolina citizen to seek injunctive relief against a violation of any FOIA 
provision."  Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC v. Gilland, 390 S.C. 312, 327, 701 S.E.2d 
39, 47 (Ct. App. 2010). Specifically, section 30-4-100(A) of the South Carolina 
Code (Supp. 2018) states:  
A citizen of the State may apply to the circuit court for a 
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or both, to 
enforce the provisions of this chapter in appropriate cases 
if the application is made no later than one year after the 
date of the alleged violation or one year after a public 
vote in public session, whichever comes later. 
Although Glassmeyer argues SCLC is not a "citizen" and therefore lacked standing 
under section 30-4-100(A) to file for a declaratory judgment, SCLC did not bring 
an action under section 30-4-100(A).  Instead, SCLC brought an action under the 
Declaratory Judgments Act seeking confirmation that the release of the 
information Glassmeyer requested would constitute an unreasonable invasion of 
the lottery winners' personal privacy in accordance with section 30-4-40(a)(2) and 
therefore may be withheld from disclosure. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-53-10 
to -140 (2005). The Declaratory Judgments Act provides that "[c]ourts of record 
within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status and 
other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed."  S.C. 
Code Ann. § 15-53-20 (2005).  As such, 
[a]ny person . . . whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute . . . may have 
determined any question of construction or validity 
arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration 
of rights, status or other legal relations . . . .  
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S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-30 (2005). The purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act 
"is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to 
rights, status and other legal relations."  S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-130 (2005); see 
also Sunset Cay, LLC v. City of Folly Beach, 357 S.C. 414, 423, 593 S.E.2d 462, 
466 (2004) ("The basic purpose of the [Declaratory Judgments] Act is to provide 
for declaratory judgments without awaiting a breach of existing rights.").  Further, 
"[t]he Declaratory Judgments Act is a proper vehicle in which to bring a 
controversy before the court when there is an existing controversy or at least the 
ripening seeds of a controversy." Sunset Cay, LLC, 357 S.C. at 423, 593 S.E.2d at 
466. Moreover, the Act "is to be liberally construed and administered."  
§ 15-53-130. 
"To fall within the intended purpose and scope of the Declaratory Judgments Act, 
the parties must seek adjudication of a justiciable controversy."  Tourism 
Expenditure Review Comm. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 403 S.C. 76, 81, 742 S.E.2d 
371, 373–74 (2013) (footnote omitted).  "Questions of statutory interpretation, by 
themselves, do not rise to the level of actual controversy."  Id. at 81, 742 S.E.2d at 
374 (internal citations omitted).  An adjudication that would not settle the legal 
rights of the parties would be "only advisory and, therefore, beyond the intended 
purpose and scope of a declaratory judgement."  Power v. McNair, 255 S.C. 150, 
154–55, 177 S.E.2d 551, 553 (1970) (holding action for declaratory judgment to 
determine whether simultaneous holding of office of city policeman and 
commission as state constable without compensation would constitute dual office 
holding prohibited by the South Carolina Constitution presented no justiciable 
controversy); see also City of Columbia v. Sanders, 231 S.C. 61, 68, 97 S.E.2d 
210, 213 (1957) ("The Uniform Declaratory Judgment[s] Act . . . 'does not require 
the court to give a purely advisory opinion which the parties might, so to speak, put 
on ice to be used if and when the occasion might arise,' or 'license litigants to fish 
in judicial ponds for legal advice.'" (citations omitted)).  Thus,  
[w]here a concrete issue is present, and there is a definite 
assertion of legal rights and a positive legal duty with 
respect thereto, which are denied by the adverse party, 
there is a justiciable controversy calling for the 
invocation of declaratory judgment action. 
Power, 255 S.C. at 153–54, 177 S.E.2d at 553 (quoting Dantzler v. Callison, 227 
S.C. 317, 321, 88 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1955)). 
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Here, there was an on-going controversy affecting the duties and obligations of 
SCLC and the rights of Glassmeyer and all the claimants who were affected by his 
FOIA requests. The permanent injunction that was granted for Doe only resolved 
the matter as to that particular claimant, and it only prohibited the release of Doe's 
personal identifying information.  Moreover, SCLC had already informed 
Glassmeyer that the personal identifying information he sought was exempted 
under FOIA. Glassmeyer made it clear that SCLC's reasoning for not disclosing 
the requested information "did not" satisfy his request, and he made another 
request for the exact same information.  Consequently, as reflected in the minutes 
of the "Executive Committee of the South Carolina Education Lottery Board of 
Commissioners," SCLC experienced  
an unusually strong negative reaction after the winners 
were notified [about Glassmeyer's request].  The number 
of calls and the concerns expressed over privacy and 
safety were greater than the last time similar information 
was requested. Several attorneys called to inquire about 
filing a lawsuit and to express concern over their client[s] 
bearing the costs associated with filing.  Other winners 
asked if they could be put on "a list" as wishing to not 
have their information disclosed.  
Thus, under these circumstances, it is understandable that SCLC would utilize the 
Declaratory Judgments Act to remove any uncertainty and insecurity with respect 
to its duties and obligations regarding disclosure under FOIA that would affect the 
rights of the remaining claimants and Glassmeyer.  See § 15-53-130 ("[The 
Declaratory Judgments Act's] purpose is to settle and to afford relief from 
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations."); 
see also Sunset Cay, LLC, 357 S.C. at 423, 593 S.E.2d at 466 ("The basic purpose 
of the [Declaratory Judgments] Act is to provide for declaratory judgments without 
awaiting a breach of existing rights."); id. ("The Declaratory Judgments Act is a 
proper vehicle in which to bring a controversy before the court when there is an 
existing controversy or at least the ripening seeds of a controversy.").  Thus, we 
find SCLC was not constrained from seeking a declaratory judgment in the instant 
matter. 
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Additionally, it is important to note that the legislature amended section 30-4-110 
of the FOIA statute in 2017. S.C. Code § 30-4-110 (Supp. 2018).6  Section 
30-4-110 is now entitled, "Hearings regarding disclosure; appropriate relief; civil 
fine for violation."  Id. Section 30-4-110(A) provides, 
A public body may file a request for hearing with the 
circuit court to seek relief from unduly burdensome, 
overly broad, vague, repetitive, or otherwise improper 
requests, or where it has received a request but it is 
unable to make a good faith determination as to whether 
the information is exempt from disclosure.  
Section 30-4-110(C) further provides that "[i]f a person or entity seeking relief 
under this section prevails, the court may order[] equitable relief as [it] considers 
appropriate[.]" Id. The FOIA statute now explicitly provides an avenue for 
agencies like SCLC to seek relief if presented with a similar factual scenario as the 
case at bar.  However, SCLC did not have the benefit of this provision in 2014.  
Thus, the Declaratory Judgments Act was a viable means for SCLC to seek relief 
and to terminate the on-going controversy.  See City of Myrtle Beach, 403 S.C. at 
82, 742 S.E.2d at 374 ("The Declaratory Judgments Act may not be invoked to 
avoid or circumvent the legislature's exclusive method for challenging [a provision 
within an act].").  Moreover, given the gravity of the interests at stake—i.e., the 
potential invasion of personal privacy for the claimants, the risk of unlimited legal 
exposure for SCLC, the potential to diminish the number of lottery players because 
of fear of their identity being exposed, and balancing the equities of Glassmeyer's 
right to request information—prudence dictated the agency's decision to have the 
circuit court declare its obligations and to remove any doubt it may have had.  See 
Power, 255 S.C. at 154–55, 177 S.E.2d at 553 ("Where a concrete issue is present, 
and there is a definite assertion of legal rights and a positive legal duty with respect 
thereto, which are denied by the adverse party, there is a justiciable controversy 
calling for the invocation of declaratory judgment action." (quoting Dantzler, 227 
6 The legislative act adopting this amendment provided, "To amend section 
30-4-110, relating to penalties for violations of the Freedom of Information Act, so 
as to remove criminal penalties, and to provide rights and remedies of public 
bodies from whom requests are made and persons with specific interests in exempt 
information for which disclosure is sought, among other things[.]"  Act No. 67, 
2017 S.C. Acts 3352 (emphases added).   
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S.C. at 321, 88 S.E.2d at 66)). Accordingly, we find SCLC had standing to file for 
a declaratory judgment.  
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT  
Glassmeyer argues the circuit court erred in issuing the declaratory judgment for 
SCLC because the balancing of the individual's privacy against the public's need to 
know weighs in his favor.  Further, Glassmeyer contends the circuit court 
considered evidence outside of the pleadings and construed the pleadings in the 
light most favorable to SCLC.  We disagree. 
"FOIA is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to carry out its 
purpose." Evening Post Publ'g Co. v. Berkeley Cty. Sch. Dist., 392 S.C. 76, 82, 
708 S.E.2d 745, 748 (2011). As the General Assembly stated, 
[I]t is vital in a democratic society that public business be 
performed in an open and public manner so that citizens 
shall be advised of the performance of public officials 
and of the decisions that are reached in public activity 
and in the formulation of public policy.  Toward this end, 
provisions of this chapter must be construed so as to 
make it possible for citizens, or their representatives, to 
learn and report fully the activities of their public 
officials at a minimum cost or delay to the persons 
seeking access to public documents or meetings. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-15 (2007). 
"FOIA's basic premise is [that] 'any person has a right to inspect or copy any public 
record of a public body.'" Evening Post Publ'g Co., 392 S.C. at 82, 708 S.E.2d at 
748 (quoting § 30-4-30(a)).  However, this right is not absolute.  "Information of a 
personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would constitute [an] 
unreasonable invasion of personal privacy" is exempt from disclosure under FOIA.  
§ 30-4-40(a)(2). The exemption provision gives the public body the discretion to 
disclose such information, stating the public body "may but is not required to" 
disclose the information.  § 30-4-40(a).  "The determination of whether documents 
or portions thereof are exempt from FOIA must be made on a case-by-case basis, 
and the exempt and non-exempt material shall be separated and the non[-]exempt 
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material disclosed."  Evening Post Publ'g Co., 392 S.C. at 82, 708 S.E.2d at 748. 
Section 30-4-40(a)(2) does not specifically list or define 
the types of records, reports, or other information that 
should be classified as personal or private information 
exempt from disclosure. We must, therefore, resort to 
general privacy principles, which examination involves a 
balancing of conflicting interests—the interest of the 
individual in privacy on the one hand against the interest 
of the public's need to know on the other. 
Burton, 358 S.C. at 352, 594 S.E.2d at 895.  "Our [s]upreme [c]ourt has defined the 
'right to privacy' as the right of an individual to be let alone and to live a life free 
from unwarranted publicity."  Id.  A plaintiff must establish three elements in order 
to receive an injunction: "(1) he will suffer immediate, irreparable harm without 
the injunction; (2) he has a likelihood of success on the merits; and (3) he has no 
adequate remedy at law."  Compton v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 392 S.C. 361, 366, 709 
S.E.2d 639, 642 (2011). 
In Glassmeyer v. City of Columbia, Glassmeyer sent a FOIA request to the City of 
Columbia, requesting all the application materials for the final three applicants for 
city manager.  414 S.C. at 216–17, 777 S.E.2d at 837.  The city provided the 
applicants' information but redacted the street name and number of the applicants' 
home addresses, some of their telephone numbers, their job references, their 
driver's license numbers, their driver's license restrictions, and some of the 
applicants' reasons for leaving their previous employment.  Id. at 217, 777 S.E.2d 
at 837. Glassmeyer filed a declaratory judgment and injunction action against the 
city. Id.  Prior to the circuit court issuing an order, Glassmeyer conceded that the 
driver's license information was exempt under state law.  Id. at 217, 777 S.E.2d at 
838. The circuit court granted Glassmeyer's request for summary judgment.  Id. at 
218, 777 S.E.2d at 838. This court reversed the circuit court, holding disclosure of 
the applicants' home addresses, telephone numbers, and personal email addresses 
would constitute an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy. Id. at 223, 777 
S.E.2d at 840–41. This court applied the balancing test, considering what 
information the city provided and noted it "fail[ed] to see how disclosure of the 
limited information . . . would serve to establish the veracity of the applicants more 
than the information [the city] already provided."  Id. at 223, 777 S.E.2d at 841. 
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We find the instant case is similar to Glassmeyer v. City of Columbia. Here, SCLC 
provided Glassmeyer with the amount of the lottery winnings, the lottery game, 
and the claimants' home towns and states.  Although Glassmeyer argues the test of 
balancing the individual's privacy against the public's need to know is in his favor, 
we disagree. Glassmeyer has not provided any reason that the public needs to 
know the information he requested or any reason as to why the information SCLC 
provided was not adequate.  See Burton, 358 S.C. at 352, 594 S.E.2d at 895 ("We 
must, therefore, resort to general privacy principles, which examination involves a 
balancing of conflicting interests—the interest of the individual in privacy on the 
one hand against the interest of the public's need to know on the other.").  When 
asked to explain why he needed the information, Glassmeyer indicated it had the 
potential for exposing government corruption.  However, without more, we are 
unable to fathom how disclosure of the rest of the information would benefit the 
public more than what was already provided.  We agree with the circuit court's 
determination that it would be an unreasonable invasion of privacy for SCLC to 
release the requested information.  See Burton, 358 S.C. at 352, 594 S.E.2d at 895 
("Our [s]upreme [c]ourt has defined the 'right to privacy' as the right of an 
individual to be let alone and to live a life free from unwarranted publicity.").  The 
lottery claimants' names are not public knowledge and the release of such 
information could lead to the discovery of other personal information.  Thus, we 
find the balancing test weighs in favor of preventing the disclosure of the 
information in order to safeguard the claimants' personal privacy.   
We disagree with Glassmeyer's argument that Glassmeyer v. City of Columbia is 
not controlling because the lottery claimants in the instant case filled out a claim 
form which stated the information may be subject to disclosure under FOIA.  The 
claimants did not waive their right to privacy just by executing the form.  The form 
merely indicated that some of the information included in the form may be subject 
to disclosure under FOIA. However, this warning does not mean the claimants 
waived any right they had to the privacy of the information on the form, such as 
their social security numbers. In fact, SCLC did disclose some of the information 
included on the form—the claimants' home towns and states.  Just as Glassmeyer v. 
City of Columbia found "[a]n individual's interest in controlling the dissemination 
of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that 
information may be available to the public in some form," we find this same 
interest does not dissolve just because the claimants were warned that some of the  
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information may be subject to disclosure.  414 S.C. at 222, 777 S.E.2d at 840 
(quoting U.S. Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500 
(1994)). 
As to Glassmeyer's argument that the circuit court considered evidence outside of 
the pleadings and construed the pleadings in a light more favorable to SCLC, we 
disagree. The question of whether the information Glassmeyer requested was 
exempt under FOIA is a question of law and does not require looking at any facts 
other than Glassmeyer's request.  Although the circuit court cited to news articles 
that were included in SCLC's complaint as examples of harm that befell lottery 
winners around the country, we believe these citations were not necessary to the 
circuit court's order.  Furthermore, Rule 12(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure indicates a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be construed as a 
motion for summary judgment if the circuit court considers facts outside of the 
pleadings, and therefore, granting the motion would be proper if there was no 
genuine issue of material fact.  See Rule 12(c) ("If, on a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by 
the [c]ourt, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Rule 56[, SCRCP] . . . .");  Fay v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 
419 S.C. 622, 628, 799 S.E.2d 318, 322 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The circuit court should 
grant a motion for summary judgment when the evidence shows 'there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.'" (quoting Rule 56(c))).  Thus, we find the circuit 
court did not err in issuing the declaratory judgment.  
COUNTERCLAIM 
Glassmeyer argues the circuit court erred in not addressing his counterclaim for 
willful abuse of process.7  We agree.  The circuit court's order did not address 
Glassmeyer's counterclaim but indicated it "conclude[d] the . . . matter."  After the 
circuit court issued its order, Glassmeyer filed a motion for reconsideration and 
asked the circuit court to rule on his counterclaim.  However, the circuit court did 
not mention the counterclaim in its order denying Glassmeyer's motion for 
7 Glassmeyer also argues the circuit court erred in not addressing his counterclaim 
for a declaratory judgment. However, we find the circuit court implicitly resolved 
Glassmeyer's counterclaim for declaratory judgment and affirm the circuit court's 
declaratory judgment.  
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reconsideration. Thus, we remand to the circuit court to address Glassmeyer's 
willful abuse of process counterclaim.  
CONCLUSION 
We find SCLC had standing under the Declaratory Judgments Act to bring this 
declaratory judgment and injunction action.  Thus, we affirm the circuit court's 
grant of injunctive relief. We affirm the circuit court's declaratory judgment that 
the information Glassmeyer requested was exempt from FOIA.  We remand to the 
circuit court to address Glassmeyer's counterclaim for willful abuse of process.8 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.9 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and GEATHERS, J., concur.  
8 Glassmeyer also appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss.  We 
decline to address this issue because it is not appealable.  See Levi v. N. Anderson 
Cty. EMS, 409 S.C. 374, 382, 762 S.E.2d 44, 48 (Ct. App. 2014) ("[T]he denial of 
a motion to dismiss does not establish the law of the case and the issue raised by 
the motion can be raised again at a later stage of the proceedings.  Therefore, the 
denial of a motion to dismiss is not directly appealable . . . ." (quoting McLendon v. 
S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 313 S.C. 525, 526 n.2, 443 S.E.2d 539, 
540 n.2 (1994))).
9 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.   
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